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I. INTRODUCTION
What constitutes "race" for determining discrimination under sec-
tion 1981, Title 42 of the United States Code?' Does "Arab" or "His-
panic" denote a race or a national origin? Does "Jewish" connote
more than a religion? The judiciary's difficulty in answering these
complex legal and sociopolitical questions is reflected by the inconsis-
tent interpretations of section 1981.2 Thus, in Saint Francis College
v. Al-Khazraji,3 the Supreme Court hoped to conclusively resolve this
conflict. The Court determined that discrimination claims based on
ancestral and ethnic characteristics fall within the definition of race
as conceived by the original framers of section 1981. However, be-
cause the distinction between ancestry and national origin 4 remains
unclear, Saint Francis College regrettably rekindles the debate as to
the role of national origin in section 1981 race discrimination claims.
This note will first explore the legislative history of section 1981
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Section 1981 reads as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
2. See, e.g., Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (allowing
victims of national origin discrimination to assert claims under section 1981); Her-
nandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Or. 1973) (Hispanics entitled to use section
1981). Contra Budinsky v. Coming Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(Slavics not entitled to claims under section 1981); Vazquez v. Werner Continental,
Inc., 429 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (Hispanics not entitled to claims under section
1981).
3. 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987); see also Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct.
2019 (1987) (companion case to Saint Francis College, wherein the Court held that
Jews could maintain an action based on racial discrimination under section 1982 of Ti-
tle 42 of the United States Code). Section 1982 states: "All citizens of the United
States shall have' the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982). See infra note 46 and accompanying text regarding
the historical interrelationship of sections 1981 and 1982.
4. See in~fra note 110 for definitions of ancestry and national origin.
from its inception in 1866- to its reenactment in the Voting Rights
Act of 1870.6 Included in this discussion will be an analysis of the in-
terplay of the 1866 and 1870 Acts with the ratification of the thir-
teenth7 and fourteenth8 amendments.
Secondly, this note will outline significant Supreme Court deci-
sions which served as a basis for the outcome in Saint Francis Col-
lege. This discussion will indicate that the Court considers section
1981 to be a broad remedy for any type of racial discrimination and is
not restricted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).9
Section III will review the factual and procedural history of Saint
Francis College. Consideration will also be given to the appropriate
statute of limitations for section 1981 claims under the Chevron Oil
Co. v. Husonl 0 analysis. Section IV is devoted to an analysis of Jus-
tice White's majority opinion, which indicates that claims based on
ancestry are actionable under section 1981. This section will also ex-
plore Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, noting the lack of a
bright line between ancestry and national origin.
Section V considers the practical impact of Saint Francis College,
focusing on the advantages of section 1981 actions and remedies, as
compared with the claims under Title VII. Finally, the note con-
cludes that Saint Francis College will inevitably result in increased
claims under section 1981 and, consequently, will diminish the effec-
tiveness of conciliation efforts under Title VII's administrative proce-
dures. With wider access to section 1981, it is predictable which
vehicle claimants will most readily pursue.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Legislative History of Section 1981
Section 1981 has as its genesis section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
186611 (the 1866 Act). The dispute as to the purpose and the scope of
5. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). See infra note 11 and accompa-
nying text.
6. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). See in4fra note 25 and accom-
panying text.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. See infra note 13.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
9. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Section 2000e-2 prohibits discrimination
in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2 (1982).
10. 404 U.S. 97 (1971); see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987).
In Goodman, the Court affirmed the Third Circuit's application of the Chevron factors
in changing the applicable statute of limitations in civil rights actions from six years to
two years. Id. at 2625. For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes 87-91 and ac-
companying text.
11. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). Section 1 of the Act states:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the
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section 1981 arose from this beginning: "[t]he central substantive
problem.., is to determine what the thirty-ninth Congress meant by
discrimination on the basis of 'race.' "12
Section 1 of the 1866 Act is viewed as giving effect to the thirteenth
amendment 13 by eradicating the Black Codes imposed by southern
states,14 and ultimately, by eliminating all racial discrimination in the
making and enforcing of contracts.15 So expansive was the concept of
race in 1866 that language in the original bill, which noted that the
proposed civil rights were to apply "without distinction of color,"'16
was eliminated as unnecessary.17 Further, the language of the Act it-
selfiL reveals that its scope is not limited solely to contractual rights
but extends to a variety of civil rights.19
However, from its inception, the constitutionality of the 1866 Act
was in doubt.20 Hence, courts and commentators agree that a pri-
United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to
any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
and penalties and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
12. See Brief for Respondent at 36, Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d
505 (3d Cir.) (No. 85-2169), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987).
13. The thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution abolished slavery
and granted Congress enforcement power against the vestiges of slavery. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII; see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 474 (1866) (statement by Sen. Trumbull); H. MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 42 (1977).
14. Black Codes were enacted in the southern states to circumvent the thirteenth
amendment and to perpetuate the vestiges of slavery. See General Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1982); C. ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UN-
DERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 70-71 (1981).
15. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295 (1976). See infra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
16. S. 61, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866); see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 209
(1866).
17. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 697-98 (1898); CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 498, 573-74 (1866). See generally Greenfield & Kates, Mexican
Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
662, 671-75 (1975).
18. See supra note 11.
19. See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 387
(1982); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 424-26 (1968); Georgia v. Rachel, 384
U.S. 780, 791 (1966). For a sampling of the scope of section 1981, see infra note 121 and
accompanying text.
20. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459, 2465 (1866) (statements by Reps. Ste-
mary purpose of the fourteenth amendment 2' was to eliminate this
uncertainty22 by safeguarding the "principles and provisions [of the
1866 Act] beyond repeal by a later Congress." 23
Following ratification of the fourteenth amendment, 24 Congress re-
enacted the provisions of section 1 of the 1866 Act as section 16 of the
1870 Act.25 Notably, the opening phrase of section 16 reads "all per-
sons within the jurisdiction of the United States."26 This language is
more inclusive than section 1 of the 1866 Act, which refers to citi-
zens. 27 The Court has indicated that this change in the 1870 Act re-
flects the references of the fourteenth amendment to "all persons"
and is thus intended to apply equally to citizens and aliens.28
Ultimately, section 16 of the 1870 Act evolved into section 1981 of
Title 42 of the United States Code.29 Thus, through ratification of
the fourteenth amendment and reenactment of section 1 into section
16 of the 1870 Act, application of the principles of section 1981 were
vens & Thayer); see also General Bldg. Contractors, 458 U.S. at 384; Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. at 675; C. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, at 203; H. MEYER, supra note 13, at 2. See
generally R. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 1-20 (1985).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
(emphasis added).
22. See supra note 20. The same Congress that enacted the 1866 Act also proposed
the fourteenth amendment for ratification by the states.
23. C. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, at 2.
24. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified by
30 of the 36 states then in existence on July 28, 1868. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1124 (3d ed. 1986).
25. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870). Section 16 of the 1870 Act
is a restatement of section 1 of the 1866 Act and embodies the same principles:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory of the United States to make and en-
force contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal ben-
efit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens ....
See supra note 11 for the full text of section 1 of the 1866 Act.
26. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (emphasis added).
27. See supra note 11.
28. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 202 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)
(discussed in text accompanying notes 50-52); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886). This reasoning is consistent with section 17 of the 1870 Act which, in proscrib-
ing penalties for violation of the civil rights provision in section 16, protects "any in-
habitant.., on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color or race
." Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (emphasis added).
29. Section 1981 was designated under the Revised Statutes of 1873-1874 as section
1977. 24 U.S. REV. STAT. § 1977 (1878). It was first incorporated into the current
United States Code under the heading Aliens & Nationality, section 41 of Title 8.
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extended to all persons, alien or citizen, within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
B. The Meaning of "Race"
The concept of race is complex, reflecting a variety of theories and
viewpoints. 30 Race has been commonly viewed in social 31 or biologi-
cal 32 terms. In the nineteenth century, however, consistent scientific
evaluations of "race" were uncommon. 33 Race generally encom-
passed common characteristics such as color, hair form, and other
distinguishing physical traits.34
The congressional debates of 1866 are replete with references to
numerous races beyond that of Caucasian and Negro.35 Additionally,
early judicial opinions indicate that "all races, classes, and conditions
of men" were encompassed by the 1866 Act and the fourteenth
amendment.36 For example, in a 1909 immigration case, the court of
appeals discussed the definition of race thoroughly. The court noted
that use of the term "European race" was improper because "a single
race called 'European or white' is contrary to ordinary usage." 37 The
court acknowledged that the United States Census Bureau reports
designated "whites" as including "all persons not otherwise classi-
fied."38 In fact, from 1899 until 1952, the United States Bureau of Im-
migration classified immigrants by race, not national origin.39
30. See Legal Definition of Race, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 571 (1958).
31. See 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Macropedia 356 (1977). However, "race"
has also been used to classify groups based on linguistic, cultural, political, or religious
characteristics. Id. On the other hand, "racism has no necessary relation to biological
or anthropological definitions .... " Id. at 360.
32. See 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 31, at 348; 13-14 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 264-65 (1968).
33. See DICTIONARY OF RACES AND PEOPLE, S. DOC. No. 662, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 3
(1911); 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 31, at 351; Greenfield & Kates, supra
note 17, at 676 (differences in 19th century classifying systems).
34. See 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 31, at 35.
35. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (Germanic), 305 (German, Irish),
498 (Indo-European, Mongolian, Chinese), 522-23 (Mongolian, Hindos, Chinese) (1866).
36. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676 (1898).
37. In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834, 838 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
38. Id. at 844, 845. See Legal Definition of Race, supra note 30, at 588 (1950 census
categories reflect the continued confusion created by racial classification systems).
39. In 1952, the use of racial criteria in naturalization policies was abrogated. A
quota system based on national origin was utilized exclusively. E. HUTCHINSON, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965, at 480 (1981). See A.
LEIBOWITZ, IMMIGRATION LAW AND REFUGEE POLICY 1-19 to 1-20 (1983) (citing W. BEN-
NETT, IMMIGRATION COMM'N REPORT, S. DOC. No. 747, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. (1910-1911)).
This report refers to over 40 racial classifications. It notes that "data based on a
However, race as used for immigration purposes referred to language
and geographical characteristics, rather than color or physical
identifiers.40
Thus, as early as the turn of the century, the confusion as to the
definition of race was embedded in American bureaucracy. Today,
modern usage still prefers the notion that race is not restricted to
three or four major groups.41
C. The Supreme Court Sets the Stage
In a series of key decisions stemming from the mid-1960's, the
Supreme Court began to set the stage for its definition of race as set
forth in Saint Francis College. First, in Georgia v. Rachel,42 Justice
Stewart indicated: "Congress intended to protect a limited category
of rights, specifically defined in terms of racial equality .... [T]he
phrase 'as is enjoyed by white citizens' was later added in committee
in the House, apparently to emphasize the racial character of the
rights being protected." 43
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 44 focused on section 1982,45 a compan-
ion to section 1981, which also derived from section 1 of the 1866
Act.46 The Court determined that section 1 of the 1866 Act was in-
tended to reach any kind of race discrimination, government or pri-
vate, since to restrict it to mere government action would make the
enforcement provisions of section 2 of the Act meaningless.47 In re-
viewing the legislative history of the 1866 Act, the Court noted that
the framers considered it a "comprehensive statute forbidding all ra-
knowledge of the country of birth alone indicated practically nothing of the racial sta-
tus of persons ...." Id.
40. A. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 39, at 1-19 to 1-33 (citing W. BENNETT, IMMIGRATION
COMM'N REPORT, S. Doc. No. 747, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. (1910-1911)). This report was
the product of the Dillingham Commission, and is viewed as the most comprehensive
review of United States immigration. I& at 1-33, n.1.
41. See, e.g., VIII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 87 (1933 & reprint 1978).
Here, "race" is initially defined as:
I. A Group of persons, animals, or plants, connected by common descent or
origin.
In the widest sense the term includes all descendants from the original
stock, but may also be limited to a single line of descent or to the group as it
exists at a particular period.
1. The offspring or posterity of a person; a set of children or descendants.
42. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
43. Id. at 791 (emphasis added); see supra note 16.
44. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
45. See supra note 3.
46. Jones, 392 U.S. at 422; see also Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431 (1973). In a unanimous decision, the Court in Tillman indicated that the
"historical interrelationship" of sections 1981 and 1982 mandates like-interpretation.
Id. at 440.
47. Jones, 392 U.S. at 423-24. Section 2 of the 1866 Act proscribes penalties for vio-
lation of the civil rights enumerated in section 1. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat.
27 (1866).
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cial discrimination affecting basic civil rights .... "48 Significantly,
the Court further rejected the notion that section 1981 was designed
to reach only government actions and concluded that it, too, reaches
private acts. 49
Building on its decision in Jones, the Court emphasized in Runyon
v. McCrary5O its view that section 1981 reaches private acts.51 The
Court noted that Congress declined to repeal the civil rights provi-
sions of the 1866 Act during the 1972 debates over amendments to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.52 The Court considered this as clear evi-
dence of Congress's intent that section 1981 apply to private as well
as governmental acts. 53
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,54 the Court ex-
tended protection against race discrimination under section 1981 to
whites. The Court determined that the statute's express reference to
"all persons" must, therefore, include whites as well as nonwhites.55
The Court further refined its interpretation of section 1981 in Gen-
eral Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania.56 Justice
Rehnquist indicated that section 1981 must be considered in light of
the "'events and passions of the time' in which the law was
forged."57 The Court concluded that the legislative history of section
1981 required that it be limited to claims of intentional discrimina-
tion and not to those based on disproportionate impact.58
Consequently, by the mid-1980's, the Court's interpretation of sec-
tion 1981 was expansive: section 1981 could be applied in private as
well as government actions; whites and nonwhites could seek relief
for racial discrimination under the statute. However, section 1981
could be used only for claims of intentional race discrimination.
48. Jones, 392 U.S. at 435. But see Justice Douglas' concurring opinion which
questions the majority's interpretation of the 1866 Act. Justice Douglas opined that
the Act was applicable only to government acts, and did not reach private acts. Id. at
454-60.
49. Jones, 392 U.S. at 437 n.73.
50. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
51. Id. at 173-75.
52. 118 CONG. REc. 3371-73 (1972); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
53. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 175.
54. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
55. Id. at 287; see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 675-76 (1898).
56. 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
57. Id. at 386 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 803 (1966)).
58. General Bldg. Contractors, 458 U.S. at 388-89.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
A. Factual History
Respondent Majid Ghaidan Al-Khazraji was born in Iraq; he is of
Arab ancestry, and practices the Muslim religion. Now a United
States citizen, Al-Khazraji holds a Ph.D. in sociology from an Ameri-
can university.5 9
Al-Khazraji was an associate professor in the department of sociol-
ogy at Saint Francis College6o (the College) from 1971 until 1979. In
1977, he was recommended by his department for a tenure position.
Although such action typically ensured acceptance by the College, no
faculty member of non-European ancestry had ever been awarded a
tenure position in the past.6 1 However, no other members of the so-
ciology department had been recommended for nor granted tenure
during this period either.6 2
Al-Khazraji was denied a tenure position in 1978 based upon the
Tenure Committee's (the Committee) negative recommendation to
the Board of Trustees. After Al-Khazraji requested reconsideration
of the decision, the Faculty Senate authorized the Faculty Affairs
Committee to review the Committee's decision. In January 1979, the
Faculty Affairs Committee recommended that the Committee recon-
sider Al-Khazraji's tenure application. However, in February, the
Committee declined to so act.63
During this period of internal review, Al-Khazraji was discouraged
from pursuing outside remedies until a final decision had been
reached by the College.6 4 He was ultimately terminated from his
faculty position in May 1979.65
B. Procedural History
1. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
Al-Khazraji initially sought relief from the Pennsylvania Human
59. See Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 507 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd
107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987); Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari at 1, Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-
2169), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987) [hereinafter Opposition Brief]; Brief for Respondent,
supra note 12, at 2.
60. Saint Francis College [hereinafter the College], a private college in Loretto,
Pennsylvania, is the primary petitioner. The remaining petitioners are nine individual
members of the College's Tenure Committee. See A-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 508.
61. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 2.
62. See Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 44-45,
Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-2169), aff'd,
107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987). Petitioner notes that the only person to be granted tenure since
Al-Khazraji's denial was respondent's wife. Id.
63. Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 507.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Relations Commission 66 (PHRC) in September 1978.67 His experi-
ence with PHRC can best be described as a bureaucratic nightmare.
He was initially advised by PHRC that no action could be taken in
1978 since "impending termination . . . was considered insufficient
reason to docket the charge or to proceed with the investigation." 68
Prior to 1980, PHRC maintained an express policy against processing
tenure denial claims until actual termination from employment. 69
Based upon this advice, Al-Khazraji postponed filing a charge with
PHRC and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 70
(EEOC) until after his termination in May 1979-more than one year
following rejection of his initial application for tenure. One year
later, the PHRC dismissed Al-Khazraji's complaint as untimely and
as superseded by a civil action filed in state court in 1979.71 PHRC
then indicated that Al-Khazraji should have filed his charge with
that agency in 1978.72 In August 1980, the EEOC also dismissed Al-
Khazraji's claim and issued its standard right to sue letter.73
66. See The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1987).
67. See Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 507.
68. Id. at 507 & n.3.
69. Id See also Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 4.
70. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) may not act on
complaints filed with state authorities until 60 days have elapsed from the date of fil-
ing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982). See generally 2 C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTS, CIVIL PRACTICE § 483 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1987); 1 W. CONNOLLY & M. CON.
NOLLY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY § 4.05 (rev. ed.
1987).
71. In May 1979, Al-Khazraji initiated a suit against the College in state court,
which was ultimately dismissed with prejudice in 1983 for failure to prosecute. Al-
Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 507. Pursuit of administrative remedies does not foreclose the
individual's right to file a civil complaint. However, the individual is required to await
the receipt of a right to sue letter from the PHRC following dismissal of the adminis-
trative action. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(c) (Purdon Supp. 1987). For a discus-
sion of the right to sue process, see infra note 73.
72. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 12, at 4. Prior to 1980, the Third Circuit
had held that the statute of limitations period for Title VII claims began when the em-
ployee was in fact terminated. See Ricks v. Delaware State College, 605 F.2d 710 (3d
Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
73. A "right to sue" letter has its statutory basis in section 2000e-5(f)(1) of Title
VII. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(f)(1) (1982). Upon filing of the initial charge with the EEOC,
the EEOC has 180 days in which to initiate a civil action or secure a conciliation agree-
ment with the respondent. At the expiration of this period, or upon the EEOC's dis-
missal of the charge, the EEOC must then notify the charging party (complainant)
that he has 90 days in which to initiate civil suit against the respondent. See C. AN.
TIEAU, supra note 70, § 494; W. CONNOLLY & M. CONNOLLY, supra note 70, § 4.06[2]; B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 238-42 (2d ed. Supp. 1987).
2. The District Court
The history of Al-Khazraji's encounter with the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania also begins with
confusion. Al-Khazraji filed three complaints with the district court:
(1) a pro se complaint against the College only, alleging violation of
Title VII; (2) an amended complaint, filed with the aid of counsel,
against the College and nine individual members of the Committee,
which included pendent state claims and alleged violations of Title
VII and sections 1981, 1983,74 1985,75 and 198676 of Title 42; and (3) a
second amended complaint, filed pro se, against the College and eight
members of the Committee, alleging only Title VII violations. 77
The district court concluded that the statute of limitations for fil-
ing the Title VII claim began to run at the denial of Al-Khazraji's
tenure application-not when he was terminated or had exhausted
internal grievance procedures.78 As to the section 1981 claim, the
court determined that Pennsylvania's six-year statute of limitations
on contract claims-not the two-year limitation on personal injury
actions-should be the applicable period.79 Thus, the section 1981
claim was not time-barred.
Al-Khazraji's original section 1981 claim had been based on "na-
tional origin, religion, and/or race"; however, his second amended
complaint did not contain the word "race."80 The court viewed this
omission as insignificant, however, and considered the claim actiona-
ble even though claims based on national origin or ancestry were
generally excluded from section 1981.81
The complaint, however, was ultimately dismissed by another dis-
trict court judge who granted the College's summary judgment mo-
tion. This judge did not consider a claim based on Arab ancestry to
be actionable under section 1981.82
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (civil action for deprivation of rights).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982) (conspiracy to interfere with civil rights).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1982) (action for neglect to prevent conspiracy).
77. Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 523 F. Supp. 386, 387 (W.D. Pa. 1981),
rev'd, 784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1986), off'd, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987).
78. Id. The district court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Delaware State
College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
79. Al-Khazraji, 523 F. Supp. at 390; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5524(7) (Purdon
Supp. 1987) (two-year statutory period for intentional personal injury claims); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5527 (Purdon Supp. 1987) (six-year statutory period for contract
claims).
80. Al-Khazraji, 523 F. Supp. at 391 n.13.
81. Id. at 391 (claims based on Arab ancestry not actionable under section 1981)
(citing Saad v. International Sec. Serv., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1978)). Compare 2
C. ANTIEAU, supra note 70, § 23 (claims based on national origin held actionable under
section 1981). See, e.g., Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Iranian); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Prod. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1985) (national
origin closely tied to race discrimination), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
82. Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 509. The inconsistency of interpretation of section
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3. The Third Circuit
Al-Khazraji appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the disposition of the Title VII claim and reversed the dis-
missal of the section 1981 claim.83 The court first analyzed the stat-
ute of limitations issue.
a. The Statute of Limitations
Section 1981 does not specify any time limitations for filing a
claim.84 Consequently, federal courts are required to apply the state
statutory period which is most analogous to civil rights actions.8 5
Since 1977, the Third Circuit had applied Pennsylvania's six-year con-
tract statute of limitations to civil rights cases.8 6 However, in Good-
man v. Lukens Steel Co.,87 the Third Circuit concluded that section
1981 has a much broader focus than mere contractual rights.8 8 Con-
sequently, it held that the two-year personal injury statute of limita-
tions was more applicable to section 1981 claims.89
The court then undertook a three-part analysis as outlined in Chev-
ron Oil Co. v. Huson 9O to determine whether the two-year period
should be applied retroactively to Al-Khazraji's claim. Retroactive
application would effectively bar the claim and would leave Al-
Khazraji without any further relief; thus defeating his reasonable ex-
pectations. The court further stated: "It would produce the most
'substantial inequitable results' to hold that [Al-Khazraji] 'slept on
his rights' at a time when he could not have known the time limita-
tion that the law imposed on him."91 The court, therefore, declined
1981 within this district court is representative of that which existed nationwide. See
supra note 2.
83. Special treatment is given to the Third Circuit's analysis since it was heavily
relied on by the Supreme Court.
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,
462 (1975). The state statutory period most analogous to civil rights actions controls
section 1981 claims.
86. Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 511; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5527 (Purdon Supp.
1987).
87. 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985), af'd, 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987).
88. Goodman, 777 F.2d at 119.
89. Id. at 120; see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5524(7) (Purdon Supp. 1987) (two-year
statute of limitations for intentional personal injury actions).
90. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). The three-part test requires an analysis of: (1) whether the
proposed decision would establish a new principle of law; (2) whether retroactive ap-
plication would retard or further the purpose of the rule; and (3) whether retroactivity
would result in harsh inequities. Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
91. Al-Khazraji, 784 F.2d at 514 (quoting Chevron, 404 U.S. at 108).
to retroactively impose the two-year statute of limitations period on
Al-Khazraji's section 1981 claim.
b. "Race" discrimination under section 1981
The Third Circuit then undertook a detailed analysis of the legisla-
tive history of the 1866 Act, the judicial interpretation of section 1981,
and encyclopedic and dictionary definitions of race. 92 The court rea-
soned that "Congress's purpose was to ensure that all persons be
treated equally, without regard to color or race, which we understand
to embrace, at the least, membership in a group that is ethnically and
physiognomically distinctive."93
Viewing broadly the scope of section 1981, the court allowed Al-
Khazraji's claim based on his Arab ancestry to proceed. The court fa-
vored the application of section 1981 in this situation by reasoning
that Arabs could easily be victims of racial prejudice: "prejudice is as
irrational as is the selection of groups against whom it is directed. It
is thus a matter of practice or attitude in the community, it is a usage
or image based on all the mistaken concepts of 'race.' "94
In a concurring opinion, Judge Adams expressed concern that this
expansive view of race converted section 1981's racial focus into one
based on national origin.95 He asserted that such a broadening was
best left to Congress, since the majority's opinion would now entitle
"virtually any nationality" to pursue a section 1981 claim.96
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice White's Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice White quickly dispensed with the
statute of limitations issue.97 The Court agreed with the Third Cir-
cuit that Al-Khazraji initiated his suit at a time when the statute of
limitations was clearly six years.98 To retroactively impose a two-
year statutory period on the claim, the Court concluded, "would be
92. Al-Khazrai, 784 F.2d at 514-18.
93. 1I at 517 n.14.
94. Id. (quoting Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.
1979)).
95. Id at 520.
96. Id. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Saint Francis College is in accord
with Judge Adams' concerns. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022,
2029 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also infra notes 109-113 and accompanying
text.
97. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to two issues: (1) the appropri-
ate statute of limitations for a section 1981 claim; and (2) the availability of a section
1981 action to an individual of Arab descent. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2025.
98. 1i at 2025. For a broader analysis of the statute of limitations issue, see supra
notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
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manifestly inequitable."9 9
The opinion then focused on the proper interpretation of race for
purposes of section 1981. The Court first pointed out that although
section 1981 does not expressly refer to race, 0 0 "judicial interpreta-
tion has construed it to have this application."101 The Court rejected
the College's contention that Al-Khazraji, as an Arab, was a member
of the "Caucasian" race, and therefore could not maintain his section
1981 claim against other Caucasians. 102
The Court noted the existence of a common twentieth century no-
tion that recognizes only "three major human races-Caucasoid,
Mongoloid, and Negroid."103 However, the Court also indicated that
such racial applications are arbitrary and do not realistically provide
guidance as to the differences between various populations.10 4 The
Court further stated: "It has been found that differences between in-
dividuals of the same race are often greater than the differences be-
tween the 'average' individuals of different races . . . . [Some]
scientists ... conclude that racial classifications are for the most part
sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature."10 5 The Court cited
extensively to nineteenth century dictionaries and encyclopedias in
support of its view that framers of the 1866 Act did not consider race
in popular twentieth century terms.'0 6 Those sources define race in
terms of ethnic groups, descendents of a common ancestor, and as a
family, tribe, people or nation.'0 7 Similarly, the congressional de-
bates surrounding the enactment of the 1866 Act and the 1870 Act
lend strong support to the notion that nineteenth century legislators
did not restrict their thinking to a three-race concept. 0 8
Here the Court marks new ground by definitively announcing that:
Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of per-
sons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their
ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial discrimination
99. Id at 2025-26.
100. Section 1981 refers only to "all persons" and to "white citizens," and omits any
references to "race." See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). However, "race" and "color" are re-
ferred to in section 1 of the 1866 Act and in section 17 of the 1870 Act. See supra notes
11 and 28.
101. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 168, 174-75 (1976)).
102. Id
103. Id at 2026 n.4 (citations omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id at 2026-27.
107. Id at 2027.
108. Id. at 2027-28.
that Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified
as racial in terms of modern scientific theory.1 0 9
The Court went beyond the Third Circuit's concept of a "distinctive
physiognomy"11o and thus arrived at an expansive notion of race for
section 1981 purposes. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Al-
Khazraji's claim of intentional discrimination based on his Arab an-
cestry was sufficient to state a cause of action under section 1981.
B. Justice Brennan's Concurring Opinion
In a brief concurrence, Justice Brennan sought to emphasize that
there is no bright line between "ancestry or ethnic characteristics"
and "national origin.""'1 He asserted that "ancestry" indicates the
"ethnic group from which [one] descended"; whereas, "national ori-
gin" denotes one's place of birth.112
Noting the legal overlap as related to Title VII claims,113 Justice
Brennan emphasized that pure national origin claims (i.e., place of
birth) could not constitute a section 1981 claim, even though they
would be actionable under Title VII.114 Thus, only a narrow class of
claims-those based on national origin-would not be cognizable
under section 1981.115
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The Court's effort to definitively resolve the long-standing dispute
over who can initiate a claim of racial discrimination under section
109. Id. at 2028 (emphasis added).
110. See Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1986).
111. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2028 (Brennan, J., concurring).
112. Id. Ancestry is defined as: "1. The relation or condition of ancestors;
progenitorship; ancestral lineage or descent." I THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 311
(1933 & reprint 1978). Similarly, ancestor is defined as: "1. One from whom a person is
descended, either by the father or mother; a progenitor, a forefather." Id. The defini-
tion for nation incorporates many of the same concepts: "1. An extensive aggregate of
persons, so closely associated with each other by common descent, language, or history,
as to form a distinct race or people, usually organized as a separate political state and
occupying a definite territory." VII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 30 (1933 & re-
print 1978). National is construed as: "1. Of or belonging to a [or the] nation; affecting,
or shared by, the nation as a whole.... 2. Peculiar to the people of a particular coun-
try, characteristic or distinctive of a nation." Id. at 31.
113. Title VII provides relief from national origin discrimination, as well as race
discrimination. To assist the EEOC in analyzing national origin claims, the Code of
Federal Regulations sets forth a definition of national origin. The definition includes,
in relevant part: "an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or... physi-
cal, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1
(1987). Thus, at least as far as the EEOC is concerned, ancestry and national origin are
clearly interrelated.
114. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2029 (Brennan, J., concurring).
115. However, some commentators have already interpreted Saint Francis College
as recognizing claims of national origin under section 1981. See 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra
note 70, § 23, at 37 (Supp. 1987). Antieau interprets the Court's references to "ancestry
and ethnic characteristics" to mean "national origin."
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1981 creates significant issues and perhaps more confusion for the
federal courts. However, the greatest impact of Saint Francis College
will surely be the interplay of section 1981 and Title VII claims.
A key purpose of Title VII is to promote conciliation and resolution
of employment discrimination claims outside of the courtroom.116 It
is "aimed at the consequences of employment practices, not at their
motivation."117 Title VII claims may be based, in addition to race, on
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 1 8
The legislative history of Title VII demonstrates that Congress en-
visioned it as a coordinated remedial package against employment
discrimination, when coupled with section 1981.119 Unlike the re-
striction against claims of intentional discrimination under section
1981, however, Title VII encompasses disparate impact cases as
well.120 As such, Title VII is a "comprehensive solution for the prob-
lem of invidious discrimination in employment .... 121
Consequently, remedies available under Title VII and section 1981
are considered "separate, distinct, and independent."122 Title VII is
limited to only those claims arising out of certain employment rela-
tionships12 3 Section 1981, however, is a broad remedy against all
forms of intentional race discrimination. 12 4 Whereas section 1981 fo-
cuses on economic relief, Title VII provides assistance in investiga-
116. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1982); 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 70, § 370; 1 W. CONNOLLY & M. CON-
NOLLY, supra note 70, § 5.04[1]; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 73, at 215-16.
117. See 2 C. ANTiEAu, supra note 70, at 370 (emphasis added).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
119. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459. Title VII and section 1981 "procedures augment each
other and are not mutually exclusive." Id Additionally, Title VII and section 1981
constitute "a flexible network of remedies to guarantee equal employment opportuni-
ties." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
120. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386 (1982);
EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984) (Title VII claims of adverse im-
pact and disparate treatment prevailing). See generally 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 70,
§ 380; B. ScHLEI & P. GROsSMAN, supra note 73, at 297-329.
121. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459.
122. Id. at 461.
123. Title VII applies to employers engaged in interstate commerce, who have 15 or
more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). Note that various parts of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 address other aspects of discrimination. For example, Title II (pub-
lic accommodations), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982); Title IV (public education), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000c (1982); Title VI (federally-funded programs), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
124. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text; 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 70,
§ 20. See, e.g., Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980) (ap-
plying section 1981 to student expelled from school on basis of race); Wright v. Salis-
bury Club, Ltd., 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of race
by club providing recreational facilities); Morgan v. Parcener's, Ltd., 493 F. Supp. 180
tion,125 conciliation, 126 counsel,127 and court costs.128
Nonetheless, throughout the 1970's, section 1981 gained popularity
as a remedy for racial employment discrimination claims due to its
inherently favorable economic and procedural incentives. 129 Plain-
tiffs in section 1981 actions are entitled to both equitable and legal re-
lief, including compensatory and punitive damages.13 0 Claims for
emotional distress are also viable under section 1981.131 Further-
more, back pay awards under section 1981 are not restricted to the
two-year limitation imposed by Title VII.132 Attorneys' fees may be
awarded, however, in either proceeding.133
Procedurally, a section 1981 claimant is entitled to a jury trial-an
additional benefit not available under Title VII.134 Moreover, a sec-
tion 1981 claim may be filed directly in federal court without first ex-
hausting Title VII and state administrative remedies.135
Consequently, section" 1981 claimants already enjoy significant eco-
nomic and procedural advantages over Title VII claimants.136
(W.D. Okla. 1978) (refusal to rent housing based on race actionable under section
1981).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
128. Id.; see Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 14 (N.D. Miss. 1976)
(costs incurred in Title VII litigation recoverable), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) (availability of attorneys' fees in Title VII
actions).
129. E.g., Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir. 1975); Young v. International Tel.
& Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
130. Section 1981 claimants are entitled to invoke federal court jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1343(4), which provides for "damages or ... equitable or other relief under
any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights .... " See Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (comparing remedies under Title VII
and section 1981); 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 70, § 520 (punitive and compensatory dam-
ages not typically available in Title VII actions).
131. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460 (discussing the possibility of awarding punitive
damages under section 1981); see, e.g., Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th
Cir. 1976).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra
note 73, at 340-55.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra
note 73, at 357-66.
134. Section 2000e-5(f)(4)-(5) requires that a district court judge or master be ap-
pointed to hear and decide the Title VII case. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4)-(5) (1982). See
also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 (1981) (stating "no right to trial by jury in
cases arising under Title VII").
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1982). A civil action may be commenced under Title
VII once the administrative charge has been disposed. See also Holt v. Continental
Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1983) (indicating section 1981 imposes no requirement
that administrative remedies must first be exhausted before filing civil suit), cerL de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984). See generally 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 70, § 484.
136. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460; 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 70, § 530; 1 W. CON-
NOLLY & M. CONNOLLY, supra note 73, § 1.02[3](a)-(b).
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The decision in Saint Francis College will further frustrate Title
VII's conciliatory approach to resolving employment discrimination
claims on two fronts. First, confusion now abides as to whether na-
tional origin claims, actionable under Title VII, are actionable under
section 1981. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion indicates that
they are not.137 However, at least one noted commentator has al-
ready interpreted Saint Francis College to, in fact, sanction national
origin claims.138 Thus, the controversy has commenced.
The confusing language can be found at the conclusion of the
Court's opinion: "If respondent on remand can prove that he was sub-
jected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was
born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin,
or his religion, he will have made out a case under § 1981."139 This
interplay of ancestry and "place or nation of origin" will undoubtedly
create confusion for federal courts trying to legitimately distinguish
between the two concepts. 140 Are they to assume that both ancestry
and national origin must be pleaded? Although the Court indicates
that national origin alone is not sufficient to state a claim under sec-
tion 1981, the weight to be afforded considerations of national origin
remains uncertain.
This issue is further complicated by the fact that neither "race"
nor "national origin" is mentioned in section 1981. Thus, the federal
courts must resort to outside resources, including prior judicial inter-
pretation, to determine the proper definitions and scope of these
terms. With inconsistent precedents upon which to rely, these courts
have little to guide their deliberations. Consequently, perceptive liti-
gants will ensure their claims are couched in terms of race, and avoid
unnecessary references to national origin. Similarly, legitimate na-
tional origin claimants will attempt to circumvent Title VII's limited
remedies and pursue a section 1981 "race" claim.
The second aspect of Saint Francis College which will frustrate Ti-
tle VII principles is the Court's reaffirmation that the appropriate
statute of limitations for section 1981 claims is that which is most
closely related to personal injury, rather than contract, actions. Com-
137. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
138. See 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 113.
139. Saint Francis College, 107 S. Ct. at 2028 (emphasis added). See Al-Khazraji v.
Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 520 (3d Cir. 1986) (Adams, J., concurring). Judge
Adams asserts that "a statute aimed at racial discrimination is being converted into
one also focused on national origin discrimination." Id.
140. See supra notes 81 and 110.
bined with an earlier decision which held that the filing of a Title VII
claim does not toll the statute of limitations for a section 1981
claim,141 claimants now have great incentive for promptly commenc-
ing an action under section 1981.
With a typically shorter statute of limitations period under applica-
ble tort law, claimants can no longer afford to await determination of
their Title VII claim before filing suit under section 1981. Such a re-
sult serves only to diminish congressional efforts "to avoid unneces-
sary and costly litigation.. .... ,142 In fact, some members of the Court
have recently acknowledged that the shorter statute of limitations
will effectively force plaintiffs into this untenable position.143
Finally, the obvious immediate impact of Saint Francis College is
that it significantly broadens the potential class of claimants under
section 1981. Groups such as Hispanics, Latinos, and Jews, 4 4 which
have been inconsistently precluded from pursuing section 1981
claims, will no longer be subjected to such piecemeal decision-mak-
ing-provided, of course, that their claims are properly phrased in ra-
cial terms. Thus, section 1981 will have finally achieved the goal of
its original framers in 1866 by providing a viable remedy for anyone
who is discriminated against based upon "racial" characteristics, how-
ever defined.
Regrettably, with this now-solid vehicle virtually open to all, the
federal courts can reasonably expect even greater congestion as the
attractive incentives offered by section 1981 become even more
widely pursued. Claimants, attorneys, and judges will experience in-
creased frustration with an already over-burdened court system.
Ironically, such discontent will lead to pre-trial settlements, thus de-
priving claimants of attractive economic possibilities like punitive
damages. Yet, even without the burdens of trial, the federal courts
must still expend their limited resources to accommodate the extra
pleadings, motions, and discovery-as well as resolve fine distinctions
between race and national origin. The fact that such an impact must
result is inevitable in this melting pot of modern American society
which tends to display a rather quick trigger-finger for litigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Saint Francis College has been heralded as a victory for those mi-
nority groups previously unrecognized as a "distinct race" for pur-
141. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 466-67.
142. Id, at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
143. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617, 2630 n.11 (1987) (Brennan,
Marshall & Blacknun, J.J., concurring and dissenting).
144. See, e.g., Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987).
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poses of section 1981.145 However, as with any victory, someone must
lose. In this case, the federal courts must bear the burden of Al-
Khazraji's victory.
In attempting to set at rest the congressional intent of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the Voting Rights Act of 1870, the Court may
have unwittingly ignored Congress's twentieth-century intent to pro-
vide a coordinated set of remedies for racial discrimination. Working
in a nineteenth-century vacuum, the Court has further undercut the
desirability, and consequently the effectiveness, of Title VII
remedies.
In an era of alternative dispute resolution-so compatible with Ti-
tle VII principles-the Court has provided significant disincentives
for claimants to pursue these federal and state administrative reme-
dies. For to do so, claimants must risk losing a viable section 1981
claim should Title VII conciliation efforts extend beyond the shorter
tort statute of limitations. Further, under Title VII, claimants have
no opportunity to reap the extensive economic and procedural bene-
fits now widely accessible under section 1981.
The perceived victory of Saint Francis College is doomed to be
short-lived; in the final analysis, reconstructive surgery will be neces-
sary to repair the damage. The ultimate resolution of the problems
created by Saint Francis College lies with Congress's ability to re-
fashion a "coordinated" program between Title VII and section 1981,
as originally envisioned in 1964. To be effective, this effort must in-
clude a legislative determination of the proper interplay, if any, be-
tween race, national origin, and ancestry.
BARBARA A. BAYLISS
145. See L.A. Times, May 19, 1987, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, May 19, 1987, at 1, col. 3.

